# CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

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FINAL RECORD OF THE SIX HUNDRED AND EIGHTY-FOURTH PLENARY MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Thursday, 30 June 1994, at 10 a.m.

President: Mr. Soemadi D.M. Brotodiningrat (Indonesia)

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The PRESIDENT: I declare open the 684th and last plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament during the second part of our annual session.

I take it as a great honour for my country, and an important responsibility for me personally, to assume the presidency of the Conference on Disarmament, particularly at this juncture when serious work and intensive negotiations are under way in the various ad hoc committees, and when extensive consultations are also going on regarding important issues. While relying on your wise counsel in the discharge of my duties and your expert advice in the conduct of our work, I pledge to you my fullest availability to discuss any matter relating to our collective undertakings.

At the outset, let me take this opportunity to express, on behalf of all of us, our deep sense of gratitude and our most sincere appreciation to my esteemed predecessor Ambassador Satish Chandra of India for his wise leadership and dedicated efforts which have enabled us to make further progress in our common endeavours. I also look forward to working closely with the distinguished Secretary-General of the Conference, Mr. Petrovsky, the Deputy Secretary-General, Mr. Bensmail, as well as with all the staff. Before proceeding further with our work, allow me to briefly share with you my reflection on some issues before us.

We are approaching the final years of the twentieth century, a century that has been so dramatic in the history of mankind. It has ingeniously enriched human life with extraordinary achievements. Yet, it has also suffered the scourge of two world wars, not to mention scores of other armed conflicts with their horrendous toll in human lives and material devastation. More important still, it has led us into a nuclear age with all its potential for peaceful exploitation as well as its threat of perils and destruction.

We live today in the presence of a dangerously paradoxical phenomenon. At the peak of the global power structure we find accumulated nuclear weapons so deadly that they are more than enough to destroy all life on Earth. At the intermediate level of the world power constellation, there exists an excessive quantity of conventional armaments. We have seen these immensely destructive weapons being used to devastating effect. And, at the lower level, we have the poverty of a vast proportion of the world's population, a deprivation as inexplicable as it is unjustifiable in terms of both the availability of resources and of their waste for armament. Indeed, although we have had many ideas, strategies and plans of action to meet the growing needs of the mass of humanity, somehow such human considerations have taken second place to the spending of war and the funding of violence.

The end of the cold war has not completely removed the dangers posed by nuclear weapons, and a resulting reduction of the threat of nuclear war should not be perceived as diminishing the need for nuclear disarmament. On the other hand, we can draw on many positive developments that have taken place in the crucial areas of limiting armaments. The quantitative growth of nuclear weapons will hopefully be soon arrested. The total number of nuclear warheads

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has declined. The successful conclusion of START II between the United States of America and the Russian Federation has significantly reduced the world's two largest nuclear arsenals. The declared moratorium of nuclear tests has continued to be observed by the majority of the nuclear-weapons States. The Convention for the elimination of chemical weapons will proscribe the military use of these instruments of mass murder.

These enlarged opportunities should therefore be seized and sustained efforts should be deployed to accelerate progress on the priority areas of the disarmament agenda. For, it is obvious that if we succumb to the temptation of temporizing with the arms race and are content with merely redressing the symptoms instead of really addressing the root causes, we will run the increasing risk of equivocating ourselves into oblivion. Rather, what is called for is the reactivation of negotiations based on the dynamic processes generated by the downward spiral of the nuclear arms race, as well as by emerging new attitudes and revised policies towards a wide range of disarmament issues.

The 1995 scheduled review and extension conference of the non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) is, without doubt, an event of major importance for the international community. it is gratifying that the proceedings of such an important event will be led by a diplomat of experience and integrity, Ambassador Dhanapala. As the primary legal and political guardian against the proliferation of nuclear weapons, the Treaty has made an important contribution to nuclear arms control. Yet for many of us, the overall record of the NPT is still less than encouraging. Divergences among parties have continued to persist in such critical areas as the disarmament aspect of the Treaty and the dissemination of nuclear know-how for peaceful purposes. The issue with which we are confronted in next year's review and extension conference should not therefore be oversimplified to a mere choice between limited and unlimited expansion. The following questions also need to be answered: Are we politically willing to redress the widely perceived imbalances in the NPT? What will be the role of the non-nuclear-weapon States in future nuclear disarmament? Are we prepared to meet the expectations of the vast majority of States parties with regard to unimpeded access to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy?

Within the framework of the Conference on Disarmament, serious negotiations are taking place on a comprehensive test-ban treaty (CTBT) under the leadership of our distinguished colleague Ambassador Marín Bosch, assisted by two other esteemed colleagues, Ambassadors Hoffmann and Dembinski. For many, if not all, of us the importance of a CTBT, which should represent an effective instrument against the horizontal and vertical proliferation of nuclear weapons and a major step toward nuclear disarmament - not to mention an urgent measure to protect the environment - cannot be overstated. What is now called for is a demonstration of political will to complement the seriousness of the technical negotiations, in order to ensure the conclusion of a comprehensive, non-discriminatory, multilaterally and effectively verifiable - and hopefully universal - CTBT, within the time-frame that will make it a truly credible component of a balanced nuclear non-proliferation

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package. In this regard, it is perhaps about time for the negotiating process to produce a text that would allow governments to have an overall view and enable them to form a political judgement on the matters involved.

Negative security assurances (NSA) is another issue before the Conference that needs our urgent and more serious attention, particularly since it is bound to also have some influence on both the CTBT negotiations and the NPT review and extension conference. In this regard, it is worth recalling the great importance that the heads of State and government of the non-aligned countries attach to a multilateral and legally binding convention governing the issue, as expressed during their tenth summit in Jakarta in 1992. This position has recently been reiterated by the non-aligned Foreign Ministers in Cairo when they stated that "security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons could contribute positively to addressing some of the dangers inherent in the presence of nuclear weapons. They reaffirmed the position of the Jakarta summit on the matter, and called upon the Conference on Disarmament to reach an urgent agreement on an internationally binding convention in this regard." Hence, fervent hopes have been placed by the vast majority of the international community in the Ad Hoc Committee on NSA, under the chairmanship of our honourable colleague Ambassador Baron Guillaume, to explore all necessary ways and means of advancing the work and focusing the negotiations on its original mandate.

It is absolutely indispensable that outer space remain free from weapons. Unquestionably, the international community will greatly benefit from the preservation of outer space, which is infinitely larger than the Earth itself, exclusively for peaceful purposes. As space technology advances and an increasing number of countries are, one way or another, involved in space activities, this celestial body has become even more relevant to the common human destiny. It is therefore only reasonable to expect that countries which have a space technology capability refrain from its militarization through the conclusion of an international agreement and cooperate in such a way as to bring the benefits of outer space technology to all nations. Under the guidance of Ambassador Pérez Novoa and his delegation, attempts have been made in the Ad Hoc Committee on PAROS to initiate a serious negotiation on this important subject, under the double-track approach of confidence-building measures as well as legal and terminological issues. However, it should be noted with regret that no significant progress has been achieved. Even more distressing is the apparent lack of interest, especially on the part of outer-space-capable States, in seriously addressing the matter. Therefore, it is useful to stress once again that General Assembly resolution 48/74 reiterated the primary role of the Conference on Disarmament in negotiating a multilateral agreement, or agreements, on the prevention of an arms race in outer space.

Let me now turn to the question of transparency in armaments (TIA). TIA has increasingly gained prominence in the disarmament agenda, especially since the adoption by consensus of General Assembly resolution 46/36 L establishing the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms. The wide support for the establishment of the Register was mainly motivated by the firm belief that it

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would constitute a confidence-building instrument needed to defuse tensions and allay misunderstandings in this era of uncertainty, thereby contributing to regional and global security. Many countries hold the view, however, that the present Register is but a first step toward a more comprehensive instrument covering all categories and types of arms, stockpiles, indigenous production and weapons undergoing research, development, testing and evaluation. For, all of those too are closely related to their perceptions of threat and security which cannot be purely and simply ignored. It should be therefore appropriate for the Ad Hoc Committee on TIA, under the guidance of our friend Ambassador Boytha, to address the question of TIA from this wider perspective.

Of no less importance is the question of fissile materials for weapons manufacturing purposes, more popularly known as the cut-off issue, which is currently being discussed under the special coordination of our colleague Ambassador Shannon. In this regard, while there is already a clear consensus recognition on the significant contribution that the banning of the production of fissile materials for weaponry purposes will make to nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament, divergences of views continue to prevail on what to do with the existing stockpile. Another related issue which will need special care is how best to ensure that, in addressing the problem, development and cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy will not be hampered. Admittedly, this is a relatively new item in our agenda. Thus it should be understandable if there is still a need for further maturation of the process in order to arrive at a complete meeting of minds.

In a rapidly changing international situation, the role of the Conference on Disarmament has become more prominent and the effective discharge of its responsibilities more urgent than ever. The disarmament agenda is still unfinished and much more remains to be done. In the few areas where progress has been made, the pace of negotiations has been excruciatingly slow and the scope of agreements reached far below our expectations, while in some new fields where consensus-building exercises are still painfully needed, pressures have been mounting to hastily conclude formal agreements. Faced with the increasingly daunting tasks, high expectations are rightly placed in the work of Ambassador Kamal on the effective functioning of the Conference, that of Ambassador Norberg on the agenda and the one carried out by Ambassador Lampreia on the membership expansion. For, under such critical circumstances, those issues have gone beyond the realm of procedural and institutional effectiveness and have indeed involved the political credibility of the Conference.

This concludes my opening statement and I thank you very much for your kind attention.

I have on the list of speakers for today the representatives of the Netherlands, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Spain, Canada and Australia. I now have the pleasure to give the floor to the representative of the Netherlands, Ambassador Wagenmakers.

Mr. WAGENMAKERS (Netherlands): Allow me to congratulate you, Ambassador Soemadi Brotodiningrat, on the assumption of the presidency of the Conference on Disarmament. The contributions of Indonesia to our common efforts in Geneva are well known. You represent a nation whose history is closely intertwined with that of the Netherlands. In fact close and brotherly ties characterize the relations between our two States and peoples. I pledge the full support of the Netherlands delegation to your stewardship. I would also like to use this opportunity to express my deep appreciation and respect to your predecessors this year: Ambassador Chandra of India, Ambassador Boytha of Hungary, Ambassador Hoffmann of Germany and Ambassador Errera of France.

Mr. President, it is the last time I take the floor, not only under your presidency but also for the foreseeable future in the plenary of this august forum. I will shortly take up new responsibilities. It is with great pleasure, but also tinged with the sadness of leaving, that I make the present statement. Rest assured, I do not intend to read out a comprehensive last will with detailed views of past, present and future activities of the Conference on Disarmament. Rather, I would like to seize this occasion to present to you my assessment of the most important issues the Conference is dealing with during the 1994 session. Thereafter I will add some personal views.

In this year's CD session the limelight is on the negotiation of a universal and effectively verifiable comprehensive test-ban treaty. Deservedly so, because after a smooth start in January last the negotiations have proceeded seriously and fruitfully, under the leadership of the Ad Hoc Committee Chairman, Ambassador Miguel Marín Bosch, and a substantial amount of tangible progress has been registered.

Working Group 1 of the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban, dealing with verification under the dynamic chairmanship of my German colleague and friend, Wolfgang Hoffmann, has taken the heavy bull by the horns and tackled head-on the complicated issues of monitoring and verification of a future comprehensive test-ban treaty. The well-established experience of the Group of Scientific Experts (GSE) has been used to deepen knowledge on seismic monitoring techniques. Preparations for fully-fledged and realistic testing of seismic systems, through the GSETT-3 exercise, are well under way. It will give us considerable insight, necessary before the future seismic system will actually begin its task of the monitoring and verifying of a treaty.

The meetings of experts on non-seismic monitoring techniques under the eminent guidance of the British Friend of the Chair, Dr. Peter Marshall, were highly successful and prepared the ground for making decisions on the inclusion of such techniques in a verification protocol.

The Netherlands favours a simple combination of techniques of proven capability and synergy to assure reasonable compliance with the treaty as well as to deter and to detect possible violations. The capability of the future system should be properly offset against the need for scrupulous cost-effectiveness. That is why my Government subscribes to the personal

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conclusions of Dr. Marshall that the future monitoring and verification system should include three non-seismic techniques, that is, monitoring of radioactivity in the atmosphere and of the presence of noble gases, hydroacoustics and a limited infrasound network. The latter might possibly be combined with a system, also rather limited in size, of detecting electro-magnetic pulses. Thus, the non-seismic network would, in the Netherlands analysis, have at its disposal a sufficient detection and localization capability.

Although no consensus yet exists, more clarity has certainly been obtained with regard to the subjects which should become part of a future treaty.

Working Group 2 on legal and institutional matters, under the gentle and efficient stewardship of Ambassador Dembinski, has developed such momentum that it has started drafting articles for the future treaty. Most of those articles transcend abstract legal and institutional provisions. They are of major relevance for ensuring the effectiveness of a treaty of truly global dimensions. Articles on the scope, on the entry into force and on the organization of a CTBT have yet to be agreed upon but, in the Netherlands' view, we are making substantial progress.

As to the scope of the CTBT, the Netherlands favours a prohibition of all nuclear tests, nuclear-weapons tests and peaceful nuclear explosions, in all environments and for all time.

The issue of entry into force is of direct relevance to the universality of the CTBT and its value as a cornerstone of the non-proliferation regime. To achieve that goal the future CTBT should be adhered to by the nuclear-weapons States and all States with relevant nuclear capabilities, especially the nuclear threshold States. On the other hand, the pertinent formula should not be too rigid and hold entry into force hostage to non-adherence by one particular State or a group of States. The treaty should help in creating the conviction that the security interests of all States - be they nuclear, nuclear threshold, nuclear-capable or non-nuclear - are best served by adhering to the CTBT.

The monitoring and verification regime of an effective organization of the CTBT is essential to ensure compliance with a future treaty. That organization cannot do without smooth and efficient collection and distribution of data received by and from the international monitoring system. Expeditious decision-making on whether to impose sanctions is indispensable to ensure that the main prohibition of the treaty can be enforced in a credible manner. Forgoing such snap decision-making would in the final analysis be of benefit to no one.

We are entering a challenging phase in the negotiations. Although additional work of a more technical nature is needed on some aspects of verification, all the careful and thorough preparations have now to be translated expeditiously into a treaty text. Consultations have to be continued on areas where no consensus exists.

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The year 1994 seems to be the year of the questionnaire. I submit that the CD should produce composite treaty texts rather than questionnaires. But seriously, when resumed in late July the negotiations will benefit greatly from the product of our work in the form of a composite text. I congratulate Ambassador Marín Bosch on his achievements in this regard.

The significance of a CTBT as an important contribution to ongoing non-proliferation efforts would only be enhanced if the Conference on Disarmament could succeed in negotiating a treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. As all delegations now apparently agree that the Conference on Disarmament is the proper forum for conducting these negotiations, it is about time to have an ad hoc committee established with an appropriate mandate to get negotiations started. The Special Coordinator, Ambassador Gerald Shannon of Canada, is to be commended for his efforts.

The Netherlands prefers a simple mandate for an ad hoc committee on cut-off, close to the wording of the General Assembly resolution calling for these negotiations. Issues on which no consensus yet exists, such as the scope of a "cut-off" treaty, can be further discussed within the ad hoc committee once it has been established.

A discussion in the ad hoc committee on the scope of a future "cut-off" treaty should, in the Netherlands' view, also address the issue of existing stocks. These stocks should be subject to some form of international administration: my Government encourages discussions and other efforts aimed at establishing reliable and transparent mechanisms to manage the globally existing stocks of plutonium and highly enriched uranium.

There is no reason why States that abide by their non-proliferation commitments should not receive some form of assurances by nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. I am glad to note that after a number of unproductive years, discussions in the Ad Hoc Committee on negative security assurances this year have acquired a ring of freshness. This is thanks to the innovative approach by the Chairman of this Ad Hoc Committee, Baron Alain Guillaume of Belgium. Indeed Ambassador Guillaume is to be commended for aiming at shifting the emphasis of cold war rhetoric to the realities of today's world, in which proliferation risks have superseded the threat of nuclear war.

The Netherlands strongly supports a two-track approach, outlined by the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on negative security assurances. That approach has it that attempts in the Conference on Disarmament to arrive at a common formula for negative security assurances to be embraced by all five nuclear-weapon States are paralleled by meaningful consultations among these five States with a view to harmonizing their respective negative security assurances. As we have understood, the five nuclear-weapon States have embarked upon meaningful consultations aimed at resolving the still existing differences on this issue.

(Mr. Wagenmakers, Netherlands)

If the above-mentioned approach is successful and unilateral declarations of nuclear-weapons States can be aligned, a further step is to have these declarations sanctioned. Negotiating a treaty, as still supported by a number of delegations around this table, does not seem to present us with sufficient potential for success. The more practical and no less "assuring" solution is that of sanctioning a unified security assurance in or by a mandatory resolution of the United Nations Security Council.

The non-proliferation Treaty is the only legal basis for international nuclear non-proliferation policies. In the international drive against proliferation, indefinite extension of the NPT in 1995 is as important as convincing States that are not party to the Treaty to adhere to it. It must be stressed that indefinite extension of the NPT will adequately safeguard it as the core of a relevant non-proliferation regime, which in turn will have considerable positive impact on the arms control and disarmament agenda of the 1990s.

I note with regret that the Ad Hoc Committee on Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space this year has again failed to produce tangible results. We should question whether the time unprofitably spent in that Committee could not be used in a better way. In this respect I think notably of engaging in discussions on a sensitive subject matter in Europe, the prohibition of attacks on nuclear facilities, under item 6 of our agenda, "Radiological weapons".

While touching on the CD's agenda, I express the hope that, sooner rather than later, we will come to grips with the long overdue rearrangement of the agenda of the Conference in such a way as to match the overall arms control and disarmament requirements of the 1990s. It can be seriously questioned whether agenda items 2, 3 and 7 still deserve the prominence given to them so far. On the other hand, keeping in mind present-day disarray in the world around us, evidently item IV of the Decalogue, "Conventional weapons", should be made operational on our annual agenda, if need be in a specified or categorized manner.

Since the CD is master of its own agenda, my delegation does not believe that rearrangements of the agenda have to be preceded by an enabling United Nations General Assembly resolution. Nor does my delegation agree with those who argue that the CD's mandate does not include responsibility for international security. Of course the CD can never supersede the United Nations Security Council, nor should it. But restricting the CD's responsibility to that of a technical negotiating body is in my view irrational. I add that agenda reform should not be made dependent on the extension of membership. Delegations of observer States should fully participate in these consultations. My delegation expects much from the trusted leadership of the Special Coordinator for the CD's agenda, Ambassador Lars Norberg.

At this moment, I would also like to thank Ambassador Ahmad Kamal for his sustained efforts to secure effective and improved functioning of the Conference. We profit daily from these Kamal-inspired improvements.

(Mr. Wagenmakers, Netherlands)

While discussing nuclear issues between the walls of the Palais des Nations, delegations around the table should be aware not to over-emphasize the danger of nuclear weapons. In the real world outside the Palais it is conventional weapons which create bloody havoc among innocent people in all regions of the world.

The significance of having an item on the agenda of the Conference on conventional weapons therefore cannot be easily over-estimated. The Ad Hoc Committee on Transparency in Armaments is the only subsidiary body of the Conference where problems relating to conventional weapons are discussed. Indeed in the years to come the credibility of the Conference stands to benefit if delegations do engage in creating meaningful and practical means aimed at promoting transparency in armaments.

The programme of work of the Ad Hoc Committee on TIA contains sufficient items, most of them of a complex nature, to secure such employment.

First, there is the requirement to provide inputs for the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms. The review of the operation of the Register and its further development is of course principally the task of the 1994 Group of Governmental Experts in New York. Preferably a similar future review should be agreed upon by the forty-ninth United Nations General Assembly. It is important however to maintain feedback between New York and Geneva so as to allow the continuing operation of the Register and its further development to benefit as much as possible from input from the CD, not only in 1994 but notably in the years to come. As a first step in the further development of the Register, it should include submission of data on military holdings and procurement through national production. That will open the way to reaching our common goal of a comprehensive, balanced Register, susceptible of universal participation.

Second, the CD has its own responsibility in elaborating universal and non-discriminatory practical means to increase openness and transparency. That request, contained in resolution 46/36 L, paragraph 11 (b), opens up an abundance of possibilities for the Ad Hoc Committee to contribute to the "family of efforts" directed at enhancing transparency in armaments. Many proposals to this effect have so far been tabled in the Ad Hoc Committee. I would like to draw attention to a Netherlands working paper, CD/TIA/WP.28, on the organization, structure and size of armed forces. To enhance transparency it is important not only to have data on equipment and machines, but also on the personnel who operate them.

If we look at the way the Ad Hoc Committee on TIA is presently operating, we must however conclude that not all delegations which supported the consensus resolutions on transparency in armaments in the past three years act in conformity therewith during the discussions in the CD. The potential of the Ad Hoc Committee on TIA is seriously frustrated by ongoing procedural debates. Often, proposed measures which would create more openness and transparency are rejected because they would allegedly compromise the security interests of States. This question touches upon the very nature of transparency. Transparency is not an end in itself, but a means to achieve

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greater confidence and to contribute to stability. Such measures do not aim at revealing State secrets or impairing a State's security. So, if there is clarity about the common objective of achieving more confidence and trust, allegations about State secrets or security being compromised should not be used to seclude oneself from transparency.

Transparency is the key concept for executing the arms control agenda of the 1990s - indeed it can be described as the new code word for enhanced security for all. In order to prove that the Conference on Disarmament has really adapted itself to the security requirements of the present decade, signal achievements vis-à-vis transparency in armaments will have to be brought about.

The United Nations Register of Conventional Arms is a confidence-building measure, not a disarmament measure. The Register does not pretend, nor does it attempt, actually to disarm by reducing the number of certain weapons. But by providing transparency, the Register aims at building confidence and reducing mistrust among nations. This in turn should lead to greater self-restraint in the procurement of conventional weapons, thus promoting stability. As a corollary, scarce socio-economic resources may be freed for the State's overall development.

There is, however, the wider relevance of control of conventional arms, particularly when large quantities of conventional arms cause widespread and indiscriminate suffering. Here, the issue of land-mines springs to mind. Apart from the necessity to provide relief for present-day disastrous situations by assistance in mine-clearing, some form of control of the future use of land-mines is imperative. To that effect, the Netherlands is actively pursuing a meaningful review of the 1980 Convention on conventional weapons. The provisions of Protocol II of that Convention should be strengthened in order to reduce the indiscriminate use of land-mines and their destructive impact on the civilian population long after armed conflicts have been ended. Notably, inclusion in the Protocol of provisions limiting the transfer of land-mines could be envisaged.

Mr. President, allow me to share with colleagues some more personal views gained by working for arms control and disarmament and in the Conference over the years. Things have changed in the outside world and the CD is gradually adapting itself to those changes. At times during the 1970s and 1980s the more appropriate qualification for the Conference would have been that of a debating club. I recall that last year a seven-letter word was used to describe that negative tendency. History has it that a distinguished colleague rejected that particular term, adding that, in his view, the term used consisted of six letters. I, for one, felt that two or three letters less would have done the trick! Anyway, if the signs do not betray us, the CD is now changing into a true multilateral negotiating forum. The conclusion of the chemical weapons Convention is proof of the relevance of the CD for real disarmament. May I once again convey my gratitude for the confidence expressed by States in choosing The Hague as the seat for the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons?

(Mr. Wagenmakers, Netherlands)

While addressing the enhanced relevance of our Conference, I should add that for the CD to be really representative, expansion of its membership is long overdue. The Netherlands delegation trusts that the Friend of the Chair, Ambassador Lampreia of Brazil, will bring the membership issue to greater fruition this year.

During the years in which I have been involved in the work of the Conference, I have been seized by different and sometimes opposite moods. At first, the wish really to contribute to a better world was mixed with being impressed by the serenity of the conference rooms and the official atmosphere of our deliberations. Our Mexican colleague is right when he criticized on more than one occasion the overly formal nature of CD procedures. I am sure many colleagues will agree that the lack of progress here in the CD more than often yielded to a feeling, if not of sheer frustration, to one of complacency. We might as well sit here and pledge allegiance to the esoteric principle of general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control, or draft a Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament, while outside the world will continue to turn, and solutions for real problems caused by human conflict cannot be found anyway.

That thought, however, should wake one up and open one's eyes. Grand ideas should make place for sober approaches, the importance of practical solutions should take priority over the impracticability of rigid ideologies. Fortunately I found in this room many, if I may say so, brothers-in-arms.

I have experienced the past few years in the Conference with great satisfaction and I am convinced that the CD has the potential to fulfil its share in meeting the security challenges of the end of this century. I think there is light for the CD, although as a true adept of Murphy's law I hasten to add that the light at the end of the tunnel might be the headlight of an oncoming train!

Not only did the experience gained here benefit my work in the Conference and its immediate surroundings, but I will also be able to harvest from it during my future professional life.

I would like to thank all my past and present colleagues and friends for the gratifying time we shared. I shall never be able to repay the personal support and friendship I received over the years. I would like to close by expressing my gratitude to the Secretary-General, Mr. Vladimir Petrovsky, his deputy, Abdelkader Bensmail, and the Conference secretariat for their professional and continuing support.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the distinguished representative of the Netherlands for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to me.

Ambassador Wagenmakers has addressed the Conference for the last time since, as we all know, he has been appointed by his Government to assume new and important duties elsewhere. Hendrik Wagenmakers has served his country with distinction in this forum, first at the very beginning of the CD's existence in 1979 and later as head of his delegation since September 1989.

(The President)

His contributions to our disarmament efforts have always been valued, most especially during the negotiations on the chemical weapons Convention. We know that he will not be entirely leaving the sphere of disarmament since he is still the current Chairman of the Group of Governmental Experts on the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms. I am sure I speak on behalf of all of us when I say that his presence here in the Conference will be missed, both from the personal and professional points of view. Zo nogmaals, mijnheer Ambassadeur, hartelijk bedankt voor uw aktieve participatie en belangrijke contributie. Wij wensen U van alles het beste met uw brilliante carriere in de toekomst [So once again, Mr. Ambassador, our heartfelt thanks for your active participation and important contributions. We wish you all the best for a brilliant career in the future.]

I now give the floor to the next speaker on the list, the representative of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Mr. Han.

Mr. HAN (Democratic People's Republic of Korea): Mr. President, it is my pleasure to congratulate you on your assumption of the presidency of the current session of the Conference on Disarmament.

With the end of the cold war era, the Powers freed from the swirls of the confrontation are now bent on expanding their spheres of influence and strengthening military capabilities, and conflicts and internal strife are on the rise unprecedentedly in several parts of the world. The prevailing situation calls on all mankind to prevent increased armament, export of arms and tensions.

It is very significant in the light of an evolving situation that the Non-Aligned Movement has discussed the issues of disarmament and international security and adopted the final document at its foreign ministerial meeting in Cairo.

It is desirable that the CD should pay deep attention to this document. This paper reflects the unanimous ideas and interests of the billions of people from more than 100 developing countries. This collective will and stand contained in the document can be a good basis for the negotiations of the Conference on Disarmament as well.

My delegation is convinced that the Non-Aligned Movement can play a positive role in realizing global disarmament and maintaining peace and security in conformity with its intrinsic principles and ideas.

It is the view of my delegation that the first and foremost task in the field of disarmament today is to achieve nuclear disarmament and complete destruction of nuclear weapons.

We, the Korean people, who live in the area where nuclear weapons were first used and who have been exposed to direct nuclear threats for decades, are opposing nuclear weapons and nuclear war more than anyone else and seeking global denuclearization.

(Mr. Han, Democratic People's Republic of Korea)

It is a widely held view that the comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty (CTBT) should be aimed at nuclear disarmament and eventual abolition of all nuclear weapons and it should also be a starting-point to serve this aim.

Many countries now demand that CTBT should not be like some disarmament arrangements made in the cold war era which are unequal and discriminatory. The negotiations for the treaty should proceed not with the outdated method practised during the confrontation period, but with a new, active approach in conformity with the changed international situation.

My delegation hopes that the independent demands of many non-nuclear-weapon States will be taken into full consideration in the drafting of the treaty and the treaty be adopted at an earlier date.

My delegation considers that the work of technical cooperation for peaceful nuclear activities and monitoring of the treaty will have to be separated from each other. Past experience shows that if the technical organization concurrently undertakes monitoring work, its technical cooperation work is subjected to restriction and double standards and partiality grow within the organization.

It is the urgent aspiration of the non-nuclear-weapon States for achieving development in a stable environment that negative security assurances are given as soon as possible. Since nuclear weapons are deployed on the globe and their delivery means are modernized, their existence itself poses constant threats to the non-nuclear-weapon States irrespective of their locations.

Therefore, the CD has been discussing this issue for over 10 years, but seeing no desired fruits as yet.

My delegation considers that it is now high time that a treaty for negative security assurances should be drafted and expresses its hope that all members of the CD display their political will in this direction. At the same time, it will be necessary that the nuclear-weapon States makes a bilateral agreement with the non-nuclear-weapon States under the former's direct nuclear threats to assure the latter against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons and also the nuclear-weapon States conclude agreement between themselves mutually promising negative security assurances.

In order to guarantee peace and security in north-east Asia in the light of the acute situation created therein, it is imperative at present to establish a new peace arrangement and settle the nuclear problem in Korea.

Peace on the Korean peninsula has been scarcely sustained by the unstable armistice agreement for the last 40 years.

Despite the existence of the Military Armistice Agreement which prohibits introduction of weapons and operational equipment from outside, all kinds of

(Mr. Han, Democratic People's Republic of Korea)

weapons including nuclear weapons have been incessantly brought into south Korea and in recent days, Patriot missiles and other sophisticated weapons are openly deployed in south Korea.

Thus, the Armistice Agreement has been wantonly violated and now it is completely invalidated, and the apparatus for supervision of the armistice could no longer perform its functions.

Accordingly, there is no practical mechanism to curb any conflicts if they break out.

Hence, the Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea proposed on 28 April 1994 to establish a new peace arrangement as an immediate step towards preventing arms build-up and recurrence of war and guaranteeing stable peace and security on a practical basis in Korea.

The signatories to the Military Armistice Agreement are the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the United States of America and all the problems relating to the maintenance of the armistice have been discussed in the past between the two countries.

In the meantime, the Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea proposed long ago to replace the Armistice Agreement with a peace agreement in order to terminate the unstable armistice status and achieve a durable peace, and the United Nations General Assembly at its thirtieth session adopted a resolution to this effect.

However, neither the resolution of the United Nations General Assembly nor the peace proposal of my Government were effectuated, and the Korean peninsula has all along witnessed tensions after tensions until it has reached today's point.

If a new peace arrangement is established on the Korean peninsula through negotiations between the two countries, the military confrontation and hostility will be removed and a peaceful climate will be created and it will be also beneficial to national reunification.

The denuclearization of the Korean peninsula is a very important question vital to the Korean nation as well as to the security of Asia and the rest of the world.

It is well known that the nuclear issue on the Korean peninsula has been originated by the introduction of nuclear weapons into south Korea and "nuclear suspicion" vis-à-vis my country created by the United States.

Therefore, the nuclear issue should and can be resolved between the parties directly concerned, that is, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the United States of America.

(Mr. Han, Democratic People's Republic of Korea)

Last year, the two countries committed themselves to the fundamental principles and to certain ways to resolve the nuclear issue and improve the relations between them in the June Joint Statement and the July Agreement.

This has provided a solid basis for resolving the nuclear issue in a peaceful way through negotiations.

Proceeding from its nature, the nuclear issue of the Korean peninsula cannot be solved by way of pressure or force.

My Government has declared more than once that it has neither the intention nor the capability to develop nuclear weapons.

With former United States President Carter's visit to my country, trust and understanding between the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the United States of America were promoted, and the two countries agreed to sit again at the third-round negotiation table in Geneva. This implies many things.

The forthcoming talks would open a prospect for resolving the question of denuclearizing the Korean peninsula in a package deal on the basis of principles agreed between the two countries.

The solution to the nuclear issue between the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the United States of America would bring about a turning-point in guaranteeing peace and security on the Korean peninsula; it would also remove our unique status with regard to the NPT and facilitate settlement of technical problems relating to the safeguards agreement.

The complicated nuclear issue and extreme situation on the Korean peninsula is due to the partiality of IAEA and the political attempts of some countries as well.

In particular, certain forces in north-east Asia stand in the way of an earlier, peaceful solution to the nuclear issue, while advocating and instigating "sanctions" and an "international system of joint cooperation" in order to preserve the excuse for justifying their nuclear programme.

The international community should not tolerate any violation or neglect of the sovereignty of a country and it should encourage dialogue and negotiation between the parties, not pressure nor power, in settling conflicts.

Last Tuesday, a preliminary contact was held for the summit meeting between the north and the south of Korea and it was agreed that the summit talks would be held in Pyongyang from 25 to 27 July 1994.

The summit talks will discuss the question of reunification and other national issues on the principle of great national unity.

(Mr. Han, Democratic People's Republic of Korea)

These issues are internal affairs and therefore, it should be solved by north and south Korea in an independent way without relying on outside forces.

For the north and the south of Korea as one nation, there is nothing more urgent and important than ending the national division and reunifying the country.

We will contribute to ensuring peace on the Korean peninsula and north-east Asia by resolving the nuclear issue in the high-level talks between the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the United States of America and the question of reunification and other national issues in the north-south summit talks.

My delegation deems it urgent to expand the membership of the CD in view of the universality of CTBT and the requirement of the changed situation. Since there exist no special rules and precedents in qualifying and selecting membership of the CD, it will have a negative effect on the negotiation character of the CD if the qualification issue of membership is affected by bilateral relations.

My delegation hopes that the question of expanding the CD membership will certainly be resolved with concerted efforts by both member and non-member States in the third part of the CD session.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to me. I now call upon the distinguished representative of Spain, Ambassador Pérez-Villanueva.

Mr. PEREZ-VILLANUEVA (Spain) (translated from Spanish): Mr. President, before commencing allow me to extend best wishes to you on behalf of my delegation and wish you every success as you take up the presidency, Ambassador Brotodiningrat. I would also like to wish all the best, and extend my best wishes for personal success and happiness, to Ambassador Wagenmakers, who is leaving us and who is going to take up important functions in a country outside this Conference - Ambassador Wagenmakers with whom I have a long-standing friendship and with whom I would have liked for many reasons to work more closely.

I would like to make the following statement on behalf of Austria, Bangladesh, Belarus, Cameroon, Chile, Colombia, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Finland, Iraq, Israel, New Zealand, Norway, the Republic of Korea, Senegal, Slovakia, South Africa, Switzerland, Syria, Turkey, Ukraine, Viet Nam, Zimbabwe and Spain.

Members of the Conference on Disarmament will no doubt recall that on 25 January this year the countries I have just mentioned drew up a joint statement calling on the Conference to achieve a consensus which could result in the expansion of the number of its members. We strongly regret that the Conference, in spite of the call addressed to it by the General Assembly of the United Nations in resolution A/48/77 B, has not yet proved capable of

(Mr. Pérez-Villaneuva, Spain)

overcoming the obstacles relating to the expansion problem. We urge the Conference to redouble its efforts so as to arrive at a solution before the 1994 session ends and before the issue is put before the forty-ninth session of the United Nations General Assembly. The 23 countries on whose behalf I speak today would like to request you, Mr. President, to distribute this statement as an official document of the Conference on Disarmament.

In my personal capacity, I would like to add a very few words. For me too today is the last time that I will be addressing the Conference on Disarmament in this plenary. I will be leaving Geneva in the next few weeks for another assignment. Therefore I would like to extend to colleagues and friends in this room my best wishes for professional success and personal happiness.

I would also like to point out that colleagues who are members of delegations that represent countries that are members of the Conference on Disarmament bear a heavy responsibility pending the enlargement of this Conference. A heavy responsibility which comes on top of the difficulties inherent in negotiation, and it is a responsibility that consists in considering that to a certain extent they are also negotiating on behalf of those countries that cannot do so fully, and which in the future will be called on to accede to and sign the legal instruments being negotiated here.

Finally, I would like to reiterate my best wishes for success to this Conference and the colleagues in it, and I would also like to wish Secretary-General Petrovsky and the Deputy Secretary-General Mr. Bensmail every happiness and professional success, and I would like to thank the staff of the secretariat for their kind presence and assistance, for their smiles and their competence. My thanks also go to the interpreters and translators. My last thought is that this is a small world and we are a small group, we will meet again one day, somewhere, and I hope in different circumstances for me.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Spain for his statement and for the kind words addressed to the presidency. On behalf of all of us, I would like to take this opportunity to wish Ambassador Pérez-Villanueva all the best for the continuation of his career. It is now my pleasure to give the floor to the distinguished representative of Canada, Ambassador Shannon, the Special Coordinator on cut-off.

Mr. SHANNON (Canada): Mr. President, I would like to begin by expressing my best wishes on the occasion of your assumption of the presidency of the Conference, and assure you that you may count on my delegation's full support during your term. I would also like to thank Ambassador Wagenmakers for his statement and for his friendship over the past four years and for the great deal of collegiality that he has shown through his stewardship of his country's interest in this Conference, and I wish to say as well to Ambassador Pérez-Villanueva that I understand very well the statesmanlike quality of his statement and the sentiments which lie behind it, and I thank you very much for your contribution.

(Mr. Shannon, Canada)

As delegations know, I was appointed Special Coordinator on cut-off during the first part of this year's session of the Conference. My mandate was, and is, to seek the views of members of the Conference on the most appropriate arrangement to negotiate a non-discriminatory, multilateral and internationally and effectively verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.

I reported on 31 March that members of the Conference were close to achieving consensus on the designation of the CD as the appropriate forum for the negotiation of a cut-off convention. My objective at that time was to continue consultations with a view to obtaining the agreement of members that the CD was the appropriate venue for such a negotiation. It was also my hope to bring in technical expertise at an early date to assist us in our deliberations and to achieve consensus by the end of June on a mandate for an ad hoc committee.

I am pleased to report that in the early days of the second part of the session, the hesitations of some delegations disappeared and general agreement was reached that the CD was the appropriate forum for the negotiation of such a treaty. I am therefore in a position to say today that the Conference has reached consensus that it is prepared to engage in the negotiation provided that we can agree on a mandate.

As a result of this progress, I concentrated my energies in the following weeks on seeking views on the development of a mandate for an ad hoc committee. It will be recalled that the United Nations General Assembly resolution in its operative section called for the negotiation of a treaty - nothing less. I have held numerous meetings to that end - both bilaterally with a number of delegations and with all groups. Unfortunately, I have not as yet been able to achieve a consensus on an appropriate mandate for the negotiations.

It became apparent in these consultations that there are a substantial number of States and a majority of groups that favour a negotiating mandate based closely, if not exactly, on the consensus United Nations General Assembly resolution 48/75 L of 16 December 1993. In a meeting of all group representatives, I noted that finding and indicated that a mandate which might meet that description could be crafted as follows. In its first part it would say that the Conference on Disarmament decides to establish an ad hoc committee on a "ban on the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices". The second part would say that the Conference directs the Ad Hoc Committee to negotiate a non-discriminatory, multilateral and internationally and effectively verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. The third part would state that the Ad Hoc Committee will report to the Conference on Disarmament on the progress of its work before the conclusion of the 1994 session.

This formulation was generally well received, but one group expressed the view in writing that many of its members believe the content of the mandate for a future ad hoc committee should include a reference not only to a ban on

(Mr. Shannon, Canada)

production, but also on the "stockpiling of fissile material for nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices" as a "significant contribution to nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation".

It is clear from my consultations both prior to and subsequent to receipt of this proposed addition by that group that an explicit reference to "stockpiling of fissile material" presents serious difficulties to other groups. Accordingly, we have not yet been able to achieve a consensus on the negotiating mandate.

In my view, a cut-off treaty is an important international initiative in its own right and it is most important, therefore, for us to try to build on the momentum achieved with the consensus resolution in the United Nations General Assembly. This Conference itself has already added to that momentum when it used the parameters of the delicately balanced language of the United Nations General Assembly resolution to create the position of Special Coordinator on cut-off which I now hold. In so doing, this Conference launched itself on a course within the United Nations General Assembly framework.

As I noted earlier, the most difficult of the issues on the mandate pertain to the appropriateness of including an explicit reference to stockpiling. The United Nations General Assembly resolution only refers to a ban on production. Some delegations in effect seek to go beyond the literal text of the United Nations General Assembly resolution to include stockpiling specifically. However, there also is a view that the adoption of a United Nations General Assembly-based negotiating mandate could proceed without prejudice to whether or not stockpiling can be addressed in the context of negotiating the verification aspects of the treaty. Whether stockpiling needs to be addressed could be dealt with at an early stage of the actual treaty negotiation. This could be done with the assistance of technical expertise on verification and on other technical aspects of the treaty from such organizations as the International Atomic Energy Agency, the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) and, of course, national experts. I think that member Governments may want to consider carefully this possibility.

I think also that members should bear in mind that if we fail to agree on a negotiating mandate before the end of this year's session in September, I obviously will have no alternative but to acknowledge our failure. In my view, this could result in us losing the momentum of the consensus achieved at the last United Nations General Assembly. If we reach for too much, we may lose what is within our grasp. This would be a serious set-back in itself, because, as I noted earlier, cut-off is an important issue in and of itself. Such a failure could as well have negative effects on the spirit in which the international community conducts its debates on a variety of disarmament and non-proliferation issues in the months ahead.

By way of conclusion, let me say simply that I intend to use all means available to me to have an ad hoc committee established with an appropriate

(Mr. Shannon, Canada)

mandate by the end of the 1994 session. I trust that I can count on the support and cooperation of all delegations in the Conference to ensure that this goal is met.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the distinguished representative of Canada, Ambassador Shannon, for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to me. I now call upon the distinguished representative of Australia, Ambassador Starr.

Mr. STARR (Australia): Mr. President, allow me to warmly congratulate you on your assumption of the presidency. It is a pleasure to welcome the representative of a country that is a close neighbour and friend of Australia to the presidency of this Conference. I can assure you of the full cooperation of my delegation. I would also like to take this opportunity to express our deep appreciation for the work of your predecessor, Ambassador Chandra of India.

I have asked for the floor today to clarify an issue raised in a plenary statement by another delegation last week. That statement referred to the issue of technological trade and cooperation in the context of the chemical weapons Convention, and mentioned the model legislation drafted by Australia to implement the Convention.

I would stress that Australia is pleased with the progress being made by the Preparatory Commission in The Hague in its important work of preparing for entry into force of the CWC. While some significant aspects of that work are incomplete, we can see no stalemate in these discussions. Australia was pleased to have become the sixth country to ratify the CWC. We welcome the reports of the substantial progress being made by other signatories in their own preparations for ratification and implementation of the CWC. This includes the key requirement of enacting national implementing legislation.

In early 1993, Australian officials developed a model for legislation to implement the CWC. This was done to provide an example of how the obligations on States parties could be succinctly and comprehensively translated into national legislation. It was based on a well-founded legal understanding of the Convention's requirements. We have been pleased by the reports that a number of signatories have found this document a useful reference for their own legislation.

I would emphasize that our preparation of model legislation reflected Australia's strong commitment to the fundamental objective of the CWC: namely, that the entire world community - developed and developing alike - should share the benefits of the Convention, and be spared the affliction of the further spread of chemical weapons.

To this end, our national export licensing policy has the sole objective of seeking to ensure that open trade in chemical products is not exploited by those seeking to make chemical weapons. The suggestion that such policies place at stake the interests of the developing world is wrong, and tragically

(Mr. Starr, Australia)

so, if one recalls that the developing world has suffered especially from chemical weapons since 1919, and would suffer directly in security terms from continuing proliferation of chemical weapons.

Export licensing based on non-proliferation concerns does not inhibit legitimate trade and economic development; to the contrary it is aimed at facilitating trade, and meeting the firm demand of international business that there should be no restraint or delay in legitimate commercial activity. As an importer of chemicals, Australia is subject to other countries' export licensing procedures. And similarly, Australian licensing measures are applied equally to all countries, regardless of their status as developing or developed. In practice, licensing procedures have very limited impact on trade and none at all for almost all of our trading partners.

In conclusion I would like to point out that at the OPCW in The Hague the issue of technological trade and cooperation, far from having reached an impasse, has been considered only briefly at expert group level, and then only in a narrow way. I urge participants at that group to take a fresh look at the opportunities: Australian and other proposals, yet to be considered, focus on the main work of this expert group - to ensure real progress is made in areas where the OPCW can encourage cooperation and can contribute to facilitating development and trade in chemicals. Our proposals reflect the commitment and desire of Australia to see the potential economic and development advantages of the CWC realized in full, to the benefit of all States parties.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Australia for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to me. He is the last speaker inscribed on my list. Does any other delegation wish to take the floor at this stage? I give the floor to the distinguished representative of the Republic of Korea.

Mr. KIM (Republic of Korea): I would like to make a brief comment with respect to the statement made by the representative of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea this morning.

First of all, it is my delegation's understanding that this Conference is not an appropriate forum for ungrounded statements, but a forum for productive consultations designed to make contributions to the development of a multilateral disarmament regime, particularly a nuclear non-proliferation regime. The denuclearization of the Korean peninsula is essential for ensuring peace and security in north-east Asia and in the world at large. My Government remains very clear in its commitment under the Joint Declaration of the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula which was signed between the two sides in 1991 and came into force in 1992. My delegation again urges North Korea to comply with this obligation under the nuclear safeguards agreements and accept inspection of its nuclear facilities by IAEA so that the possibility of nuclear weapons proliferation on the Korean peninsula is eliminated.

(Mr. Kim, Republic of Korea)

In concluding, I honestly hope that the summit meeting between the leaders of the Republic of Korea and the DPRK to be held from 25 to 27 July 1994 may pave the way for the realization of the above-mentioned South-North Joint Declaration of the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.

The PRESIDENT: Is there any other delegation who would like to take the floor at this juncture? There seems to be none.

May I now turn to the informal paper circulated by the secretariat, containing the timetable of meetings to be held by the Conference and its subsidiary bodies during the first week of the third part of the annual session, that is from 25 to 29 July 1994? This timetable has been prepared in consultation with the chairmen of the ad hoc committees. As usual, it is merely indicative and may be changed, if necessary. On that understanding, may I suggest that we adopt it? I recognize the distinguished representative of Kenya.

Mr. DON NANJIRA (Kenya): Mr. President, let me first of all congratulate you on the manner you are guiding the deliberations of this Conference. I thank you and your predecessor very much for the excellent job that you have been and are doing and, I am sure, for the contributions that your delegation and the delegation of India will continue to make to the success of this Conference's deliberations in future sessions. Obviously, both of you are members of the Group of 21 and I am very proud of you. On behalf of the Group of 21, I would like to make some general comments, not that we are standing in the way of consensus, but because I have the mandate and the duty to convey the position of the Group of 21.

Generally speaking, the Group of 21 on the question of the timetable for the future would have liked that the Monday morning slot which is to be utilized, be utilized by Working Group 2 of the Ad Hoc Committee on NTB. That was the preference of the Group of 21 after a very long discussion. Yesterday, in your own consultations with the group representatives, I did present this position but after a long discussion, you did make some recommendations as to what we thought should be the case to enable the work of this Conference to proceed. Following your appeal, and after discussion within the Group of 21 this morning, I am pleased to inform you that the Group of 21 can go along with your proposal on the condition, however, that the meeting on Monday morning does not overlap or run parallel with any other meetings at that time. The simple reason is that many of us in the G.21 are one-man or one-woman delegations and we would like to participate in all the important meetings that are going to take place. Therefore, it would be extremely difficult for most of us to participate actively in these meetings if they are going to overlap or run parallel. So this is a very important message that my Group has asked me to convey to you. Of course, each delegation within the Group of 21 is free to take the floor, but I am just informing you of this. Of course, we will continue to negotiate with a view to reaching consensus as we think the point of consensus is very important and as the timetable is presented to us, we will discuss it and make our position known to you. I thought I should convey this to you as mandated to me by the Group of 21.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the distinguished representative of Kenya for his statement, for his kind words addressed to me and, above all, for the flexibility that the Group of 21 has shown on the question of the schedule of work for the first week of the third part of our session. I promise him to ask the secretariat to see to it that Monday morning's meeting will not run parallel with other meetings. With this, may I go back to my suggestion to adopt the informal paper in front of us?

It was so decided.

The PRESIDENT: Before I adjourn this meeting, I have been asked to announce that there will be a meeting of the Ad Hoc Committee on NTB after the meeting of the Working Group on Verification tomorrow, Friday.

The next plenary meeting of the Conference will be held on Thursday, 28 July 1994, at 10 a.m.

The meeting rose at 11.45 a.m.